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PLEA BARGAINING

Waiver ofDoubleJeopardy Protection and Guilty Plea:
How Final is a Bad Deal?
by Daniel Blinka

United States
V.

Ray C. Broce
(Docket No. 87-1190)
Argument Date: October4,1988
The term "plea bargaining" conjures up images of lawyers
haggling over the worth of their case like merchants at some
Near Eastern rug bazaar. The deal-like atmosphere extends
to notions that once a deal is struck, the parties must live up
to their word. A deal is a deal.
Criminal defendants sometimes make deals that they
come to regret. Later events may occur that transform what
appeared to be a good deal into a rather bad one.
This case presents such a situation. When defendants pled
guilty to two counts of conspiracy arising out of very similar
conduct, it appeared to be an efficacious way to avoid a
plethora of other potential charges. But defendants came to
regret the deal when other defendants successfully argued
that multiple conspiracy charges could not be legally
charged because in fact there had been only one (very large)
conspiracy. The question is whether these defendants can
renege on their earlier deal and reap the benefits of the later
ruling?
ISSUE
The issue before the Court is whether a defendant who
has pled guilty to two indictments alleging two different
criminal conspiracies is entitled to a factual hearing on
whether the two conspiracies alleged were actually parts of a
single conspiracy. The defendants had pled guilty to the
charges as part of a plea bargain and first raised this contention long after the guilty plea and sentencing had taken
place.
FACr$
Ray Broce, the president of Broce Construction Co. in
Kansis, was indicted along with the corporation for conspiring to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act and committing mail
fraud. The subject of this indictment was a conspiracy to rig
Kansas highway construction bids on the "Meade County
DanielBlinka is an Assistant Professorof Law at Marquette
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project." Broce and the corporation were represented by
counsel, who entered into a plea bargain with federal
prosecutors.
It was agreed that Broce and the corporation would plead
guilty to charges of conspiracy to rig bids on the Meade
County project. The government would also file another
indictment charging defendants with conspiracy to rig bids
on a Barton County (Kansas) project; defendants agreed to
plead guilty to this charge as well. Broce himself also agreed
to plead guilty to the mail fraud charge contained in the first
indictment.
In exchange for the plea, the prosecution agreed (1) not
to charge defendants with other antitrust violations in Oklahoma and Kansas, (2) to dismiss the remaining mail fraud
charge against the corporation and (3) to recommend a
$1,500,000 fine against the corporation.
Defendants pled guilty in accordance with this negotiation in early 1982. The guilty plea procedure appears to have
been constitutionally antiseptic. At the later sentencing hearing, the court fined the corporation $1,500,000 and sentenced Broce to imprisonment for two years (plus a $50,000
fine) for each of the Sherman Act conspiracies and fined him
$1,000 on the mail fraud count.
Neither Broce nor the corporation filed an appeal. Broce
served his prison term and paid all of his fines. The corporation has paid one-half of its fine, according to the United
States' brief.
In February, 1983, more than a year after the guilty pleas
were entered, defendants filed motions asking the court to
vacate their sentences on the charges contained in the
second Indictment (stemming from the Barton County project). Defendants asserted that other related litigation culminating in the decision in United States v. Beacbner (555 F.
Supp. 1273 (D. Kan. 1983)) established that the bid rigging
scandal in Kansas, which included Broce's escapades, constituted a single, overarching conspiracy to rig bids; it was not a
constellation of separate, smaller conspiracies aimed only at
individual highway projects.
In short, they complained that the Double Jeopardy
Clause precluded separate conspiracy charges stemming
from defendants' effort to rig bids on the different highway
projects. Both were part of one criminal conspiracy, not two
conspiracies; therefore, the prosecution could not chop up
one crime into smaller bits and charge defendants with
multiple conspiracies.
After a series of appellate maneuverings, the court of
appeals agreed with defendants' position. It upheld the
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factual finding made by the district court that the Kansas bid
rigging network constituted only one, on-going conspiracy,
not multiple, separate conspiracies. It also rejected the
government's argument that defendants had waived any
double jeopardy claims by pleading guilty and sitting on
their hands while other appellate remedies expired.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Guilty pleas are the lifeblood of the criminal justice
system. Over 90% of all charges are disposed of in this
manner. Most guilty pleas are the product of plea bargaining
between the parties in which the defendant trades away
various rights in exchange for concessions (real or imagined) from the prosecution. Most often defendants seek the
dismissal of pending charges or binding commitments not to
issue still other charges (thus reducing the exposure to
prison time), or promises by the prosecutor to recommend
lighter sentences.
The prosecution also receives benefits from this practice.
Besides securing a certain conviction, the prosecutor often
extracts information from the defendant about other criminal
activity or secures the defendant's testimony against the
other criminals as well. (Here, Broce testified for the government In other cases concerning the bid rigging scandal.)
Guilty pleas carry with them two other alluring features,
in addition to those just described: they bring certainty and
finality to criminal proceedings. When a case is tried to jury,
the outcome is always uncertain until the verdict is returned.
Regardless of the advocate's skill in presenting evidence and
confidence in the outcome, there are no guarantees of a
favorable verdict. Although a bargained guilty plea generally
falls short of the ideal outcome hoped for by each side, it is a
sure thing upon acceptance by the court (which is usually
the case). The other seductive attraction, particularly for the
prosecution, is the finality of the guilty plea. Once the plea is
accepted and sentence pronounced, the case is literally
finished. Competent defense counsel are often able to attack
charges with myriad challenges, factual and legal, which can
make the task of trying the case exceedingly difficult and
open the door to years of appellate wrangling about alleged
errors; victory at trial may be bittersweet or short-lived for the
prosecutor. Where the defendant pleads guilty, however, he
waives nearly all challenges to the charges, thus effectively
precluding later appellate attacks on just about everything
but the plea and sentencing procedures themselves.
In this case the parties bargained over the charges and
disposition. Broce and the corporation pled guilty to the two
separate indictments which alleged on their face the existence of two distinct conspiracies. Defendants did not object
to this characterization either at the time of the guilty plea or
the sentencing. Moreover, they passed up their primary
rights to appeal; this challenge came more than a year after
the guilty pleas, as a "collateral" attack on the sentence.
Although the issue of whether defendants' original attorney
effectively represented them during the guilty plea procedure is not before the Court, the record contains evidence
Issue No. 1

that the original lawyer never thought of the double jeopardy
issue. It was only when defendants in other related bid
rigging cases identified and successfully litigated the multiple conspiracy issue that Broce brought this challenge.
The essence of the government's position is that defendants had the opportunity to raise the issue but willingly
surrendered it in exchange for various concessions. Moreover, by pleading guilty to the charges in the indictments, the
defendants agreed that there were two separate conspiracies;
therefore, they are not entitled to litigate this issue only after
the guilty plea. Regardless of the outcome of the other bid
rigging cases, the defendants should not be allowed to
escape the deal they made with the prosecutor simply
because others did better later on.
This case presents, then, the finality of the guilty plea
procedure and the question of what escapes, if any, are
available to a defendant who entered into a deal and later
wants it changed. It must be borne in mind that Broce's case
is narrowly focused on a double jeopardy issue which is
further complicated by the vagaries of federal conspiracy law.
This is not an instance where a defendant simply changes his
mind about the deal or attempts to reopen the matter
following successful trials by his confederates who opted for
their chances at trial. The latter problems are rather easily
resolved under present law.
The Court will be called upon to decide how a guilty plea
affects the waiver of double jeopardy rights. It may decide
that if the face of the indictments reflect separate charges,
then any later challenges are waived. Or the Court may
consider whether special steps should be taken at the guilty
plea proceeding to specifically advise defendants about their
double jeopardy right and that the plea works a "waiver" of
those rights. In particular, the Court may elaborate upon its
holding in Ricketts v. Adamson (No. 86-6, June 22, 1987;
Preview, 1986-87 term, pp. 350-352), which held defendants
to the consequences of their voluntary choice to plead guilty
in the double jeopardy context. Adamson had pled guilty to
reduced murder charges in exchange for his testimony
against other accomplices. When Adamson later welshed on
his promise to cooperate with the prosecution, the government reopened and dismissed the, reduced charges against
him and then charged him with even more serious offenses.
The Court held that this scenario did not violate the double
jeopardy clause, as defendant had violated the terms of the
deal and was aware that such a breach allowed the prosecution to refile the original charges.
ARGUMFN'IS
For the United States of Anterica (Counsel, Charles Fried,
Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530; telephone (202) 633-2217)
Respondents (Broce and Broce Construction Co.) were
not entitled to invalidate convictions, following guilty pleas
pursuant to plea agreements, on double jeopardy grounds:
A. Respondents were not entitled to litigate factual question
after pleading guilty.

B. Respondents were not entitled to repudiate their guilty
pleas after inducing the government to rely on those
pleas.

For Ray C Broce and Broce Constuction Co., Inc
(Counsel of Record, Glenn E. Casebeer II, 215 West Eighth
Street, Coffeyvile, KS 67337 telephone (316)251.6530)
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Respondents did not waive their double jeopardy right by
entering a plea of guilty:
A. The vague indictments brought by the government require a factual determination of their validity.
B. The government's requirement as part of a plea agreement that the defendant enter a plea of guilty to two
indictments does not invalidate the double jeopardy
claim.
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